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Abstract
We study the repeated congestion game, in which multiple populations of players share resources,
and make, at each iteration, a decentralized decision on which resources to utilize. We investigate the
following question: given a model of how individual players update their strategies, does the resulting
dynamics of strategy profiles converge to the set of Nash equilibria of the one-shot game? We consider
in particular a model in which players update their strategies using algorithms with sublinear discounted
regret. We show that the resulting sequence of strategy profiles converges to the set of Nash equilibria
in the sense of Cesa`ro means. However, strong convergence is not guaranteed in general. We show
that strong convergence can be guaranteed for a class of algorithms with a vanishing upper bound on
discounted regret, and which satisfy an additional condition. We call such algorithms AREP algorithms,
for Approximate REPlicator, as they can be interpreted as a discrete-time approximation of the replicator
equation, which models the continuous-time evolution of population strategies, and which is known to
converge for the class of congestion games. In particular, we show that the discounted Hedge algorithm
belongs to the AREP class, which guarantees its strong convergence.
1 Introduction
Congestion games are non-cooperative games that model the interaction of players who share resources.
Each player makes a decision on which resources to utilize. The individual decisions of players result in a
resource allocation at the population scale. Resources which are highly utilized become congested, and the
corresponding players incur higher losses. For example, in routing games –a sub-class of congestion games,
the resources are edges in a network, and each player needs to travel from a given source vertex to a given
destination vertex on the graph. Each player chooses a path, and the joint decision of all players determines
the congestion on each edge. The more a given edge is utilized, the more congested it is, creating delays for
those players using that edge.
The one-shot congestion game has been studied extensively, and a comprehensive presentation is given for
example in [19]. In particular, congestion games are shown to be potential games, thus their Nash equilibria
can be expressed as the solution to a convex optimization problem. Characterizing the Nash equilibria of the
congestion game gives useful insights, such as the loss of efficiency due to selfishness of players. One popular
measure of inefficiency is the price of anarchy, introduced by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou in [14], and
studied in the case of routing games by Roughgarden et al. in [20]. While characterizing Nash equilibria of
the one-shot congestion game gives many insights, it does not model how players arrive to the equilibrium.
Studying the game in a repeated setting can help answer this question. Additionally, most realistic scenarios
do not correspond to a one-shot setting, but rather a repeated setting in which players make decisions in
an online fashion, observe outcomes, and may update their strategies given the previous outcomes. This
motivates the study of the game and the population dynamics in an online learning framework.
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Arguably, a good model for learning should be distributed, and should not have extensive information
requirements. In particular, one should not expect the players to have an accurate model of congestion of the
different resources. Players should be able to learn simply by observing the outcomes of their previous actions,
and those of other players. No-regret learning is of particular interest here, as many regret-minimizing
algorithms are easy to implement by individual players, and only require the player losses to be revealed.
The Hedge algorithm (also known as boosting or the exponential update rule) is a famous example of regret-
minimizing algorithms. It was introduced to the machine learning community by Freund and Schapire in [12],
a generalization of the weighted majority algorithm of Littlestone and Warmuth [15]. The Hedge algorithm
will be central in our discussion, as it will motivate the study of the continuous-time replicator equation,
and will eventually be shown to converge for congestion games.
No-regret learning and its resulting population dynamics have been studied in the context of routing
games, a special case of congestion games. For example, in [4], Blum et al. show that the sequence of
strategy profiles converges to the set of -approximate Nash equilibria on a (1− )-fraction of days. In other
words, a subsequence of strategy profiles (in which an  fraction of terms is dropped) converges to the set
of -approximate Nash equilibria. They also give explicit convergence rates which depend on the maximum
slopes of the congestion functions.
Continuous-time population dynamics have also been studied for congestion games. In [10], Fischer and
Vocking study the convergence of the replicator dynamics for the congestion game. The replicator ODE is also
of particular interest in evolutionary game theory, see for example [23]. In [21], Sandholm studies convergence
for the larger class of potential games. He shows that dynamics which satisfy a positive correlation condition
with respect to the potential function of the game converge to the set of stationary points of the vector field
(usually, a superset of Nash equilibria). However, many regret-minimizing algorithms do not satisfy this
correlation condition. Our discussion is mainly concerned with discrete-time dynamics. However, properties
of the replicator equation will be used in our analysis.
We will consider a model in which the losses are discounted over time, using a vanishing sequence of
discount factors (γτ )τ∈N, meaning that future losses matter less to players than present losses. This defines
a discounted regret, and we will focus our attention on online learning algorithms with sublinear discounted
regret. The sequence of discount factors will have several interpretations beyond its economic motivation.
For example, we will observe that some multiplicative weight algorithms, such as the Hedge algorithm,
have sublinear discounted regret if we use the sequence (γτ )τ as learning rates, provided it also satisfies∑
τ≤T γτ
2/
∑
τ≤T γτ → 0 as T →∞.
After defining the model and giving preliminary results in Sections 2 and 3, we show in Section 4 that
when players use online learning algorithms with sublinear discounted regret, the sequence of strategy profiles
converges to the set of Nash equilibria in the Cesa`ro sense. In order to obtain strong convergence, we first
motivate the study of the replicator dynamics. Indeed, it can be viewed as a continuous-time limit of the
Hedge algorithm with decreasing learning rates. In Section 5, we recall the convergence result of the replicator
dynamics. By discretizing the replicator equation (using the same discount sequence (γτ )τ∈N as discretization
time steps) we obtain a multiplicative-weights update rule with sublinear discounted regret, which we call
REP algorithm, for replicator. Finally, in Section 6, we define a class of online learning algorithms we call
the AREP algorithms, which can be expressed as a discrete REP algorithm with perturbations that satisfy
a condition given in Definition 12. Using results from the theory of stochastic approximation, we show that
strong convergence is guaranteed for AREP algorithms with sublinear discounted regret. We finally observe
that both the REP algorithm and the Hedge algorithm belong to this class, which proves convergence for
these two algorithms in particular.
2 The congestion game model
In the congestion game, a finite set R of resources is shared by a set X of players. The set of players is
endowed with a structure of measure space, (X ,M,m), where M is a σ-algebra of measurable subsets, and
m is a finite Lebesgue measure. The measure is non-atomic, in the sense that single-player sets are null-sets
for m. The player set is partitioned into K populations, X = X1 ∪ · · · ∪ XK . For all k, the total mass of
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population Xk is assumed to be finite and nonzero. Each player x ∈ Xk has a task to perform, characterized
by a collection of bundles Pk ⊂ P, where P is the power set of R. The task can be accomplished by choosing
any bundle of resources p ∈ Pk. The action set of any player in Xk is then simply Pk.
The joint actions of all players can be represented by an action profile a : X → P such that for all
x ∈ Xk, a(x) ∈ Pk is the bundle of resources chosen by player x. The function x 7→ a(x) is assumed to
be M-measurable (P is equipped with the counting measure). The action profile a determines the bundle
loads and resource loads, defined as follows: for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} and p ∈ Pk, the load of bundle p under
population Xk is the total mass of players in Xk who chose that bundle
fkp (a) =
∫
x∈Xk
1(a(x)=p)dm(x) (1)
For any r ∈ R, the resource load is defined to be the total mass of players utilizing that resource
φr(a) =
K∑
k=1
∑
p∈Pk:r∈p
fkp (a) (2)
The resource loads determine the losses of all players: the loss associated to a resource r is given by cr(φr(a)),
where the congestion functions cr are assumed to satisfy the following:
Assumption 1. The congestion functions cr are non-negative, non-decreasing, Lipschitz-continuous func-
tions.
The total loss of a player x such that a(x) = p is
∑
r∈p cr(φr(a)).
The congestion model is given by the tuple (K, (Xk)1≤k≤K ,R, (Pk)1≤k≤K , (cr)r∈R). The congestion game
is determined by the action set and the loss function for every player: for all x ∈ Xk, the action set of x is
Pk, and the loss function of x, given the action profile a, is∑
p∈P
1(a(x)=p)
∑
r∈p
cr(φr(a)).
2.1 A macroscopic view
The action profile a specifies the bundle of each player x. A more concise description of the joint action of
players is given by the bundle distribution: the proportion of players choosing bundle p in population Xk is
denoted by µkp(a) = f
k
p (a)/m(Xk), which defines a bundle distribution for population Xk,
µk(a) = (µkp(a))p∈Pk ∈ ∆Pk ,
and a bundle distribution across populations, given by the product distribution
µ(a) = (µ1(a), . . . , µK(a)) ∈ ∆P1 × · · · ×∆PK .
We say that the action profile a induces the distribution µ(a). Here ∆Pk denotes the simplex of distributions
over Pk, that is
∆Pk =
µ ∈ RPk+ : ∑
p∈Pk
µp = 1

The product of simplexes ∆P1 × · · · ×∆PK will be denoted ∆. This macroscopic representation of the joint
actions of players will be useful in our analysis. We will also view the resource loads as linear functions of
the product distribution µ(a). Indeed, we have from equation (2) and the definition of µkp(a)
φr(a) =
K∑
k=1
m(Xk)
∑
p∈Pk:r∈p
µkp(a) =
K∑
k=1
m(Xk)(Mkµk(a))r
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where for all k, Mk ∈ RR×Pk is an incidence matrix defined as follows: for all r ∈ R and all p ∈ Pk,
Mkr,p =
{
1 if r ∈ p
0 otherwise
We write in vector form φ(a) =
∑K
k=1m(Xk)Mkµk(a), and by defining the scaled incidence matrix M¯ =(
m(X1)M1| . . . |m(XK)MK
)
, we have
φ(a) = M¯µ(a)
By abuse of notation, the dependence on the action profile a will be omitted, so we will write µ instead
of µ(a) and φ instead of φ(a). Finally, we define the loss function of a bundle p ∈ Pk to be
`kp(µ) =
∑
r∈p
cr(φr) =
∑
r∈p
cr((M¯µ)r) = M
>c(M¯µ) (3)
where M is the incidence matrix M =
(
M1| . . . |MK ), and c(φ) is the vector (cr(φr))r∈R. We denote
by `k(µ) the vector of losses (`kp(µ))p∈Pk , and by `(µ) the K-tuple `(µ) = (`
1(µ), . . . , `K(µ)).
2.2 Nash equilibria of the congestion game
We can now define and characterize the Nash equilibria of the congestion game, also called Wardrop equilibria,
in reference to [22].
Definition 1 (Nash equilibrium).
A product distribution µ is a Nash equilibrium of the congestion game if for all k, and all p ∈ Pk such that
µkp > 0, `
k
p′(µ) ≥ `kp(µ) for all p′ ∈ Pk. The set of Nash equilibria will be denoted by N .
In finite player games, a Nash equilibrium is defined to be an action profile a such that no player has an
incentive to unilaterally deviate [17], that is, no player can strictly decrease her loss by unilaterally changing
her action. We show that this condition (referred to as the Nash condition) holds for almost all players
whenever µ is a Nash equilibrium in the sense of Definition 1.
Proposition 1. A distribution µ is a Nash equilibrium if and only if for any joint action a which induces
the distribution µ, almost all players have no incentive to unilaterally deviate from a.
Proof. First, we observe that, given an action profile a, when a single player x changes her strategy, this
does not affect the distribution µ. This follows from the definition of the distribution,
µkp =
1
m(Xk)
∫
Xk
1(a(x)=p)dm(x).
Changing the action profile a on a null-set {x} does not affect the integral.
Now, assume that almost all players have no incentive to unilaterally deviate. That is, for all k, for
almost all x ∈ Xk,
∀p′ ∈ Pk, `kp′(µ′) ≥ `ka(x)(µ) (4)
where µ′ is the distribution obtained when x unilaterally changes her bundle from a(x) to p′. By the
previous observation, µ′ = µ. As a consequence, condition (4) becomes: for almost all x, and for all p′,
`kp′(µ) ≥ `ka(x)(µ). Therefore, integrating over the set {x ∈ Xk : a(x) = p}, we have for all k,
`kp′(µ)µ
k
p ≥ `kp(µ)µkp for all p′.
which implies that µ is a Nash equilibrium in the sense of Definition 1. Conversely, if a is an action profile,
inducing distribution µ, such that the Nash condition does not hold for a set of players with positive measure,
then there exists k0 and a subset X ⊂ Xk0 with m(X) > 0, such that every player in X can strictly decrease
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her loss by changing her action. Let Xp = {x ∈ X : a(x) = p}, then X is the disjoint union X = ∪p∈PkXp,
and there exists p0 such that m(Xp0) > 0. Therefore
µk0p0 =
m ({x ∈ Xk0 : a(x) = p0})
m(Xk0)
≥ m(Xp0)
m(Xk0)
> 0.
Let x ∈ Xp0 . Since x can strictly decrease her loss by unilaterally changing her action, there exists p1 such
that `k0p1(µ) < `
k0
a(x)(µ) = `
k0
p0(µ). But since µ
k0
p0 > 0, µ is not a Nash equilibrium.
Definition 1 also implies that, for a population Xk, all bundles with non-zero mass have equal losses,
and bundles with zero mass have greater losses. Therefore almost all players incur the same loss. This
observation motivates a second characterization of Nash equilibria, in terms of the average loss.
Definition 2 (Average loss). The average loss incurred by population Xk is the real number:
¯`k(µ) =
1
m(Xk)
∫
Xk
`ka(x)(µ)dm(x) =
∑
p∈Pk
µkp`
k
p(µ)
Proposition 2. µ is a Nash equilibrium if and only if for all k and all p ∈ Pk, `kp(µ) ≥ ¯`k(µ).
Proof. If µ is a Nash equilibrium, then all bundles with non-zero mass have equal losses, and bundles with
zero mass have greater losses. That is, for all k, there exists p0 ∈ Pk such that for all p, if µp > 0 then
`kp(µ) = `
k
p0(µ), and if µp = 0, then `
k
p(µ) ≥ `kp0(µ). Thus
¯`k(µ) =
∑
p∈Pk:µp>0
µp`
k
p(µ) =
 ∑
p∈Pk:µp>0
µp
 `kp0(µ) = `kp0(µ),
and it follows that for all p, `kp(µ) ≥ `kp0(µ) = ¯`k(µ).
Conversely, assume that for all p, `kp(µ) ≥ ¯`k(µ), and let p0 ∈ arg minp∈Pk:µp>0 `p(µ). Then,
`kp0(µ) ≥ ¯`k(µ) =
∑
p∈Pk:µp>0
µp`
k
p(µ) ≥ `kp0(µ)
∑
p∈Pk:µp>0
µp = `
k
p0(µ)
and the inequalities must hold with equality, thus all bundles with non-zero mass have the same loss (equal to
the average loss), while bundles with zero mass have larger losses. This proves that µ is a Nash equilibrium.
2.3 Mixed strategies
The Nash equilibria we have described so far are pure strategy equilibria, since each player x deterministically
plays a single action a(x). We now extend the model to allow mixed strategies. That is, the action of a
player x is a random variable A(x) with distribution pi(x), and with realization a(x).
We show that when players use mixed strategies, provided they randomize independently, the resulting
Nash equilibria are, in fact, the same as those given in Definition 1. The key observation is that under
independent randomization, the resulting bundle distributions µk are random variables with zero variance,
thus they are essentially deterministic.
To formalize the probabilistic setting, let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space. A mixed strategy profile is a
function A : X → Ω→ P, such that for all k and all x ∈ Xk, A(x) is a Pk-valued random variable, such that
the mapping (x, ω) 7→ A(x)(ω) is M×F-measurable. For all x ∈ Xk and p ∈ Pk, let pikp(x) = P[A(x) = p].
Similarly to the deterministic case, the mixed strategy profile A determines the bundle distributions µk,
which are, in this case, random variables, as we recall that:
µkp =
1
m(Xk)
∫
Xk
1(A(x)=p)dm(x)
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Nevertheless, assuming players randomize independently, the bundle distribution is almost surely equal to
its expectation, as stated in the following Proposition. The assumption of independent randomization is a
reasonable one, since players are non-cooperative.
Proposition 3. Under independent randomization,
∀k, almost surely, µk = E[µk] = 1
m(Xk)
∫
Xk
pik(x)dm(x)
Proof. Fix k and let p ∈ Pk. Since (x, ω) 7→ 1(A(x)=p)(ω) is a non-negative bounded M× F-measurable
function, we can apply Tonelli’s theorem and write:
E
[
µkp
]
= E
[
1
m(Xk)
∫
Xk
1(A(x)=p)dm(x)
]
=
1
m(Xk)
∫
Xk
E
[
1(A(x)=p)
]
dm(x)
=
1
m(Xk)
∫
Xk
pikp(x)dm(x)
Similarly,
m(Xk)2 var
[
µkp
]
= E
(∫
Xk
1(A(x)=p)dm(x)
)2
−
(∫
Xk
pikp(x)dm(x)
)2
=
∫
Xk
∫
Xk
E1(A(x)=p;A(x′)=p)dm(x)dm(x′)−
∫
Xk
∫
Xk
pikp(x)pi
k
p(x
′)dm(x)dm(x′)
=
∫
Xk×Xk
(
P[A(x) = p;A(x′) = p]− pikp(x)pikp(x′)
)
d(m×m)(x, x′)
Then observing that the diagonal D = {(x, x) : x ∈ Xk} is an (m×m)-nullset (this follows for example from
Proposition 251T in [11]), we can restrict the integral to the set Xk ×Xk \D, on which P[A(x) = p;A(x′) =
p] = pikp(x)pi
k
p(x
′), by the independent randomization assumption. This proves that var
[
µkp
]
= 0. Therefore
µkp = Eµkp almost surely.
We observe that here, the assumption of non-atomicity is essential. This fact is reminiscent of temperature
in statistical physics: independent measurements of the global distribution of the same state yield the same
result almost surely.
2.4 The Rosenthal potential function
We now discuss how one can formulate the set of Nash equilibria as the solution of a convex optimization
problem. Consider the function
V (µ) =
∑
r∈R
∫ (M¯µ)r
0
cr(u)du (5)
defined on the product of simplexes ∆P1 × · · · ×∆PK , which will be denoted ∆. V is called the Rosenthal
potential function, and was introduced in [18] for the congestion game with finitely many players, and later
generalized to the infinite-players case. It can be viewed as the composition of the function V¯ : φ ∈ RR+ 7→∑
r∈R
∫ φr
0
cr(u)du and the linear function µ 7→ M¯µ. Since for all r, cr is, by assumption, non-negative,
V¯ is differentiable, non-negative and ∇V¯ (φ) = (cr(φr))r∈R. And since cr are non-decreasing, V¯ is convex.
Therefore V is convex as the composition of a convex and a linear function.
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A simple application of the chain rule gives ∇V (µ) = M¯>c(M¯µ). If we denote ∇µkV (µ) the vector of
partial derivatives with respect to µkp, p ∈ Pk, we have ∇µkV (µ) = m(Xk)Mk>c(M¯µ) = m(Xk)`k(µ). Thus,
∀k, ∀p ∈ Pk, ∂V
∂µkp
(µ) = m(Xk)`kp(µ) (6)
and V is a potential function for the congestion game, as defined in [21] for example.
Next, we show the relationship between the set of Nash equilibria and the potential function V .
Theorem 1 (Rosenthal [18]). N is the set of minimizers of V on the product of simplexes ∆. It is a
non-empty convex compact set. We will denote VN the value of V on N .
A version of this theorem is proved in [18]. We also give a proof in Appendix B.
Since the set of Nash equilibria can be expressed as the solution to a convex optimization problem, it can
be computed in polynomial time in the size of the problem. Beyond computing Nash equilibria, we seek to
model how players arrive at the set N . This is discussed in Section 3. But first, we define routing games, a
special case of congestion games.
2.5 Example: routing games
A routing game is a congestion game with an underlying graph G = (V, E), with vertex set V and edge set
E ⊂ V × V. In this case, the resource set is equal to the edge set, R = E . Routing games are used to model
congestion on transportation or communication networks. Each population Xk is characterized by a common
source vertex sk ∈ V and a common destination vertex tk ∈ V. In a transportation setting, players represent
drivers traveling from sk to tk; in a communication setting, players send packets from sk to tk. The action
set Pk is a set of paths connecting sk to tk. In other words, each player chooses a path connecting his or her
source and destination vertices. The bundle load fkp is then called the flow on path p. The resource load φr
is called the total edge flow. Finally, the congestion functions φr 7→ cr(φr) determine the delay (or latency)
incurred by each player.
2 3
0 1
4 5
Figure 1: Routing game with two populations of players.
We will use the routing game given in Figure 1 as an example to illustrate some of our results in later
sections. In this example, two populations of players share the network, the first population sends packets
from v0 to v1, and the second population from v2 to v3. The population masses are F1 = F2 = 1. The
congestion functions are given below:
c(v0,v1)(u) = u+ 2 c(v0,v4)(u) =
u
2
c(v0,v5)(u) = u
c(v2,v3)(u) = u+ 1 c(v2,v4)(u) =
1
2
c(v4,v3)(u) = u
c(v4,v5)(u) = 3u c(v5,v1)(u) =
u
3
c(v5,v3)(u) =
u
4
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The paths (bundles) available to each population are given by:
P1 = {(v0, v1), (v0, v4, v5, v1), (v0, v5, v1)}
P2 = {(v2, v3), (v2, v4, v5, v3), (v2, v4, v3)}
In this case, since the congestion functions are linear, the Rosenthal potential function is quadratic. Its
minimizer is, in this example, unique, given by
N = ((0, 0.187, 0.813), (0.223, 0.053, 0.724))
and the corresponding path losses are given by
• for all p ∈ P1 \ (v0, v4, v5, v1), `1p(µ) = 1.14
• for p = (v0, v4, v5, v1), `1p(µ) = 2.00
• for all p ∈ P2, `2p(µ) = 1.22
3 Online learning in congestion games
We now describe the online learning framework for the congestion game, and present the Hedge algorithm
in particular.
3.1 The online learning framework
Suppose that the game is played repeatedly for infinitely many iterations, indexed by τ ∈ N. During iteration
τ , each player chooses a bundle simultaneously. The decision of all players can be represented, as defined
above, by an action profile a(τ) : X → P. This induces, at the level of each population Xk, a bundle
distribution µk
(τ)
. These, in turn, determine the resource loads and the bundle losses `kp(µ
(τ)). The losses
for bundles p ∈ Pk are revealed to all players in population Xk, which marks the end of iteration τ . Players
can then use the information revealed to them to update their strategies before the start of the next iteration.
A note on the information assumptions Here, we assume that at the end of the iteration, a player
observes the losses of all bundles p ∈ Pk. Instead, one could assume that a player can only observe the
losses she incurs. This is often called the multi-armed-bandit setting, in reference to the armed-bandit slot
machines, in which a gambler can choose, at each iteration, one machine to play, and is only revealed the
loss of that machine. Making this restriction requires players to use additional exploration of bundles. A
comprehensive presentation of online learning algorithms in the multi-armed bandit setting, both stochastic
and deterministic, can be found for example in [6, 2]. Regret bounds are also given in [9] (Section 6.7,
p.156-159) and [8, 7]. We choose to use the full feedback assumption to simplify our discussion, leaving the
multi-armed-bandit setting as a possible extension. We believe this is a reasonable model in many games,
since bundle losses could be announced publicly. In the special case of routing games, this can be achieved
by having a central authority measure and announce the delays. This is particularly true in transportation
networks, in which many agencies and online services measure delays and make this information publicly
available. Assuming the full vector of bundle losses is revealed does not mean, however, that players have
access to the individual resource loads φ
(τ)
r , or to the congestion functions cr(·), which is consistent with
our initial argument that, in a realistic model, players should only rely on the observed value of the bundle
losses.
Each player x ∈ Xk is assumed to draw her bundle from a randomized strategy pi(τ)(x) ∈ ∆Pk (the
deterministic case is a special case in which pi(τ)(x) is a vertex on the simplex, i.e. a pure strategy). As
discussed in Section 2.3, players randomize independently. At the end of iteration τ , player x updates her
strategy using an update rule or online learning algorithm, as defined below.
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Definition 3 (Online learning algorithm for the congestion game). An online learning algorithm (or update
rule) for the congestion game, applied by a player x ∈ Xk, is a sequence of functions
(
Ux (τ)
)
τ∈N, fixed a
priori, that is, before the start of the game, such that for each τ ,
Ux (τ) :
(
RPk
)τ ×∆Pk → ∆Pk(
(`k(µ(t)))t≤τ , pi(τ)(x)
)
7→ pi(τ+1)(x)
is a function which maps, given the history of bundle losses (`k(µ(t)))t≤τ , the strategy on the current day
pi(τ)(x) to the strategy on the next day pi(τ+1)(x).
The online learning framework is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Online learning framework for the congestion game
1: For every player x ∈ Pk, an initial mixed strategy pi(0)(x) ∈ ∆Pk and an online learning algorithm ( Ux (τ))τ∈N
2: for each iteration τ ∈ N do
3: Every player x independently draws a bundle according to her strategy pi(τ)(x), i.e. A(τ)(x) ∼ pi(τ)(x).
4: The vector of bundle losses `k(µ(τ)) is revealed to all players in Pk. Each player incurs the loss of the bundle
she chose.
5: Players update their mixed strategies: pi(τ+1)(x) = Ux (τ)((`kp(µ
(t)))t≤τ , pi(τ)(x)).
6: end for
We will focus our attention on algorithms which have vanishing upper bounds on the average discounted
regret, defined in the next section.
3.2 Discounted regret
Since the game is played for infinitely many iterations, we assume that the losses of players are discounted over
time. This is a common technique in infinite-horizon optimal control for example, and can be motivated from
an economic perspective by considering that losses are devalued over time. We also give an interpretation
of discounting in terms of learning rates, as discussed in Section 3.4.
Let (γτ )τ∈N denote the sequence of discount factors. We make the following assumption:
Assumption 2. The sequence of discount factors (γτ )τ∈N is assumed to be positive decreasing, with limτ→∞ γτ =
0 and limT→∞
∑T
τ=0 γτ =∞.
On iteration τ , a player x ∈ Xk who draws an action A(τ)(x) ∼ pi(τ)(x) incurs a discounted loss given by
γτ `
k
A(τ)(x)
(µ(τ)), where µ(τ) is the distribution induced by the profile A(τ). The cumulative discounted loss
for player x, up to iteration T , is then defined to be
L(T )(x) =
T∑
τ=0
γτ `
k
A(τ)(x)(µ
(τ)) (7)
We observe that this is a random variable, since the action A(τ)(x) of player x is random, drawn from a
distribution pi(τ)(x). The expectation of the cumulative discounted loss is then
E[L(T )(x)] =
T∑
τ=0
γτ E
[
`kA(τ)(x)(µ
(τ))
]
=
T∑
τ=0
γτ
〈
pi(τ)(x), `k(µ(τ))
〉
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where 〈·, ·〉 denotes the Euclidean inner product on RPk . Similarly, we define the cumulative discounted loss
for a fixed bundle p ∈ Pk
L kp
(T )
=
T∑
τ=0
γτ `
k
p(µ
(τ)) (8)
We can now define the discounted regret.
Definition 4 (Discounted regret). Let x ∈ Xk, and consider an online learning algorithm for the congestion
game, given by the sequence of functions
(
Ux (τ)
)
τ∈N. Let (µ
(τ))τ∈N be the sequence of distributions, deter-
mined by the mixed strategy profile of all players. Then the discounted regret up to iteration T , for player x,
under algorithm U , is the random variable
R(T )(x) = L(T )(x)− min
p∈Pk
L kp
(T )
(9)
The algorithm U is said to have sublinear discounted regret if, for any sequence of distributions (µ(τ))τ∈N,
and any initial strategy pi(0),
1∑T
τ=0 γτ
[
R(T )(x)
]+
→ 0 almost surely as T →∞ (10)
If we have convergence in the L1-norm, 1∑T
τ=0 γτ
[
E
[
R(T )(x)
]]+ → 0, we say that the algorithm has sublinear
discounted regret in expectation.
We observe that, in the definition of the regret, one can replace the minimum over the set Pk by a
minimum over the simplex ∆Pk
min
p∈Pk
L(T )p = min
pi∈∆Pk
〈
pi, L(T )
〉
since the minimizers of a bounded linear function lie on the set of extremal points of the feasible set.
Therefore, the discounted regret compares the performance of the online learning algorithm to the best
constant strategy in hindsight. Indeed,
〈
pi, L(T )
〉
is the cumulative discounted loss of a constant strategy pi,
and minimizing this expression over pi ∈ ∆Pk yields the best constant strategy in hindsight: one cannot know
a priori which strategy will minimize the expression, until all losses up to T are revealed. If the algorithm
has sublinear regret, its average performance is, asymptotically, as good as the performance of any constant
strategy, regardless of the sequence of distributions (µ(τ))τ∈N.
A note on monotonicity of the discount factors: A similar definition of discounted regret is used
for example by Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi in Section 3.2 of [9]. However, in their definition, the sequence
of discount factors is increasing. This can be motivated by the following argument: present observations
may provide better information than past, stale observations. While this argument is accurate in many
applications, it does not serve our purpose of convergence of population strategies. In our discussion, the
standing assumption is that discount factors are decreasing.
Finally, we observe that the cumulative discounted loss and regret are bounded, uniformly in x.
Proposition 4. There exists ρ ≥ 0 such that ∀k,
∀p ∈ Pk, ∀µ ∈ ∆, `kp(µ) ∈ [0, ρ] (11)
∀x ∈ Xk, 1∑T
τ=0 γτ
L(T )(x) ∈ [0, ρ] (12)
∀x ∈ Xk, 1∑T
τ=0 γτ
[
R(T )(x)
]+
∈ [0, ρ] (13)
Proof. Since the bundle loss functions µ 7→ `kp(µ) are continuous on the compact set ∆, they are bounded,
and since there are finitely many bundles, there exists a common bound ρ such that for all k, for all p ∈ Pk
and all µ, 0 ≤ `kp(µ) ≤ ρ. The bounds (12) and (13) follow from (11) and the definitions (7) and (9) of
L(T )(x) and R(T )(x).
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3.3 Population-wide regret
We have defined the discounted regret R(T )(x) for a single player x. In order to analyze the population
dynamics, we define a population-wide cumulative discounted loss Lk
(T )
, and discounted regret Rk
(T )
as
follows:
Lk
(T )
=
1
m(Xk)
∫
Xk
L(T )(x)dm(x) (14)
Rk
(T )
=
1
m(Xk)
∫
Xk
R(T )(x)dm(x) = Lk
(T ) − min
p∈Pk
L kp
(T )
(15)
Since L(T )(x) is random for all x, Lk
(T )
is also a random variable. However, it is, in fact, almost surely equal
to its expectation. Indeed, recalling that µkp
(τ)
is the proportion of players who chose bundle p at iteration
τ (also a random variable), we can write
Lk
(T )
=
T∑
τ=0
γτ
1
m(Xk)
∫
Xk
`kA(τ)(x)(µ
(τ))dm(x)
=
T∑
τ=0
γτ
1
m(Xk)
∑
p∈Pk
∫
{x∈Xk:A(τ)(x)=p}
`kp(µ
(τ))dm(x)
=
T∑
τ=0
γτ
∑
p∈Pk
µkp
(τ)
`kp(µ
(τ)) (16)
thus assuming players randomize independently, µ(τ) is almost surely deterministic by Proposition 3, and so
is Lk
(T )
. The same holds for Rk
(T )
.
Proposition 5. If almost every player x ∈ Xk applies an online learning algorithm with sublinear regret in
expectation, then the population-wide regret is also sublinear.
Proof. By the previous observation, we have, almost surely,
Rk
(T )
= E
[
Rk
(T )
]
=
1
m(Xk)
∫
Xk
E
[
R(T )(x)
]
dm(x)
where the second equality follows from Tonelli’s theorem. Taking the positive part and using Jensen’s
inequality, we have
1∑T
τ=0 γτ
[
Rk
(T )
]+
≤ 1
m(Xk)
∫
Xk
1∑T
τ=0 γτ
[
E
[
R(T )(x)
]]+
dm(x)
By assumption, 1∑T
τ=0 γτ
[
E
[
R(T )(x)
]]+
converges to 0 for all x, and by Proposition 4, it is bounded uniformly
in x. Thus the result follows by applying the dominated convergence theorem.
3.4 Hedge algorithm with vanishing learning rates
We now present one particular online learning algorithm with sublinear regret. Consider a congestion game,
and let ρ be an upper bound on the losses. The existence of such an upper bound was established in
Proposition 4.
Definition 5 (Hedge algorithm). The Hedge algorithm, applied by player x ∈ Xk, with initial distribution
pi(0) ∈ ∆Pk and learning rates (ητ )τ∈N is an online learning algorithm ( Ux (τ))τ∈N such that the τ -th update
11
function is given by
Ux (τ)((`k(µ(t)))t≤τ , pi(τ)) = ψ
(pi(τ)p exp
(
−ητ
`kp(µ
(τ))
ρ
))
p∈Pk

where ψ is the normalization function
ψ : RPk+ \ {0} → ∆Pk
v 7→ v∑
p∈Pk vp
That is, the distribution at iteration τ + 1 is proportional to the following vector
pi(τ+1) ∝
(
pi(τ)p exp
(
−ητ
`kp(µ
(τ))
ρ
))
p∈Pk
(17)
Intuitively, the Hedge algorithm updates the distribution by computing, at each iteration, a set of bundle
weights, then normalizing the vector of weights. The weight of a bundle p is obtained by multiplying the
probability at the previous iteration, pi
(τ)
p , by a term which is exponentially decreasing in the bundle loss
`kp(µ
(τ)), thus the higher the loss of bundle p at iteration τ , the lower the probability of selecting p at the next
iteration. The parameter ητ can be interpreted as a learning rate, as discussed in the following proposition.
Proposition 6. The Hedge update rule (17) is the solution to the following optimization problem:
pi(τ+1) ∈ arg min
pi∈∆Pk
〈
pi,
`k(µ(τ))
ρ
〉
+
1
ητ
DKL(pi‖pi(τ)) (18)
where DKL(pi‖ν) =
∑
p∈Pk pip log
pip
νp
is the Kullback-Leibler divergence of distribution pi with respect to ν.
Proof. Consider the Lagrangian of the problem, with dual variable λ ∈ R associated to the constraint∑
p∈Pk pip = 1,
L(pi;λ) =
∑
p∈Pk
pip
`k(µ(τ))
ρ
+
1
ητ
∑
p∈Pk
pip log
pip
pi
(τ)
p
+ λ
∑
p∈Pk
pip − 1
 ,
its gradient is given by
∂
∂pip
L(pi;λ) = `
k
p(µ
(τ))
ρ
+
1
ητ
(
log
pip
pi
(τ)
p
+ 1
)
+ λ
∂
∂λ
L(pi;λ) =
∑
p∈Pk
pip − 1
and (pi?, λ?) are primal-dual optimal if and only if the gradient of L vanishes at (pi?, λ?), that is,
pi∗p = pi
(τ)
p exp
(
−1− ητλ− ητ `
k(µ(τ))
ρ
)
∑
p∈Pk
pi?p = 1
which can be rewritten as pi?p =
1
αpi
(τ)
p exp
(
−ητ `
k(µ(τ))
ρ
)
, with α = exp (1 + ητλ) =
∑
p′∈Pk pi
(τ)
p′ α exp
(
−η `k(µ(τ))ρ
)
is the normalization constant. Thus pi? satisfies the Hedge update equation (17).
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The objective function in (18) is the sum of an instantaneous loss term
〈
pi, `
k(µ(τ))
ρ
〉
and a regularization
term 1ητDKL(pi‖pi(τ)) which penalizes deviations from the previous distribution pi(τ), with a regularization
coefficient 1ητ . The greedy problem (with no regularization term) would yield a pure strategy which concen-
trates all the mass on the bundle which had minimal loss on the previous iteration. With the regularization
term, the player “hedges her bet” by penalizing too much deviation from the previous distribution. The
coefficient ητ determines the relative importance of the two terms in the objective function. In particular, as
ητ → 0, the solution to the problem (18) converges to pi(τ) since the regularization term dominates the in-
stantaneous loss term. In other words, as ητ converges to 0, the player stops learning from new observations,
which justifies calling ητ a learning rate.
Remark 1. The sequence of distributions given by the Hedge algorithm also satisfy, for all τ ,
pi(τ+1) ∝
(
pi(0)p exp
(
−
τ∑
t=0
ηt
`kp(µ
(t))
ρ
))
p∈Pk
(19)
This follows from the update equation (17) and a simple induction on τ . In particular, when ητ = γτ ,
the term
∑τ
t=0 ηt`
k
p(µ
(t)) coincides with the cumulative discounted loss L kp
(τ)
defined in (8). This motivates
using the discount factors γτ as learning rates. We discuss this in the next proposition.
Proposition 7. Consider a congestion game with a sequence of discount factors (γτ )τ∈N satisfying As-
sumption 2. Then the Hedge algorithm with learning rates (γτ ) satisfies the following regret bound: for any
sequence of distributions (µ(τ))τ and any initial strategy pi
(0),
E[R(T )(x)] ≤ −ρ log pi(0)min +
ρ
8
T∑
τ=0
γ2τ ,
where pi
(0)
min = minp∈Pk pi
(0)
p . In particular, when
∑
τ≤T γ
2
τ∑
τ≤T γτ
→ 0, the Hedge algorithm with rates (γτ ) has
sublinear discounted regret in expectation.
Proof. Given an initial strategy pi(0), define ξ : u ∈ RPk 7→ log
(∑
p∈Pk pi
(0)
p exp(−upρ )
)
. Recalling the ex-
pression of the cumulative bundle loss L kp
(τ)
=
∑τ
t=0 γt`
k
p(µ
(t)), we have for all τ ≥ 0:
ξ(L k
(τ+1)
)− ξ(L k(τ)) = log
∑
p∈Pk
pi
(0)
p exp
(
−L
k
p
(τ)
ρ
)
∑
p′∈Pk exp
(
−L
k
p′
(τ)
ρ
) exp(−γτ+1 `kp(µ(τ+1))
ρ
)
= log
∑
p∈Pk
pi(τ+1)p exp
(
−γτ+1
`kp(µ
(τ+1))
ρ
)
≤ −γτ+1
∑
p∈Pk
pi(τ+1)p
`kp(µ
(τ+1))
ρ
+
γ2τ+1
8
The last inequality follows from Hoeffding’s lemma (see Appendix A), since 0 ≤ `
k
p(µ
(τ))
ρ ≤ 1. Summing over
τ ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}, we have for all p:
ξ(L k
(T )
)− ξ(L k(0)) ≤ −
T∑
τ=1
γτ
∑
p∈Pk
pi(τ)p
`kp(µ
(τ))
ρ
+
1
8
T∑
τ=1
γ2τ
13
But we also have
ξ(L k
(0)
) = log
∑
p∈Pk
pi(0)p exp
(
−γ0 `
k(µ(0)
ρ
) ≤ −γ0 ∑
p∈Pk
pi(0)p
`kp(µ
(0))
ρ
+
γ20
8
And as log is increasing, we have for all p0 ∈ Pk, log(pi(0)p0 exp(−
L kp0
(T )
ρ )) ≤ ξ(L k
(T )
), thus
−L
k
p0
(τ)
ρ
+ log pi(0)p0 ≤ ξ(L k
(T )
) ≤ −
T∑
τ=0
γτ
∑
p∈Pk
pi(τ)p
`kp(µ
(τ))
ρ
+
1
8
T∑
τ=0
γ2τ
Rearranging, we have for all p ∈ Pk
T∑
τ=0
γτ
∑
p∈Pk
pi(τ)p `
k
p(µ
(τ))−L kp0
(T ) ≤ −ρ
8
log pi(0)p0 + ρ
T∑
τ=0
γ2τ
and we obtain the desired inequality by maximizing both sides over p0 ∈ Pk.
The previous proposition provides an upper-bound on the expected regret of the Hedge algorithm, of the
form
E
[
R(T )(x)
]∑
τ≤T γτ
≤ −ρpi(0)min
1∑
τ≤T γτ
+
ρ
8
∑
τ≤T γ
2
τ∑
τ≤T γτ
Given Assumption 2 on the discount factors, we have limT→∞
∑
τ≤T γ
2
τ∑
τ≤T γτ
= 0 (see Fact 1 in the Appendix),
which proves that the discounted regret is sub-linear. This also provides a bound on the convergence rate.
For example, if γτ ∼ 1τ , then the upper-bound is equivalent to clog T , converges to zero as T → ∞, albeit
slowly. A better bound can be obtained for sequences of discount factors which are not square-summable,
for example, taking γτ ∼ 1√τ , the upper-bound is equivalent to c log TT 12 .
We now have one example of an online learning algorithm with sublinear discounted regret. Further-
more, we have an interpretation of the sequence γτ as learning rates, which provides additional intuition on
Assumption 2 on (γτ ): decreasing the learning rates will help the system converge.
In the next section, we start our analysis of the population dynamics when all players apply a learning
algorithm with sublinear discounted regret.
4 Convergence in the Cesa`ro sense
As discussed in Proposition 5, if almost every player applies an algorithm with sublinear discounted regret
in expectation, then the population-wide discounted regret is sublinear (almost surely). We now show that
whenever the population has sublinear discounted regret, the sequence of distributions (µ(τ))τ converges in
the sense of Cesa`ro. That is,
∑
τ≤T γτµ
(τ)/
∑
τ≤T γτ converges to the set of Nash equilibria. We also show
that we have convergence of a dense subsequence. First, we give some definitions.
Definition 6 (Convergence in the sense of Cesa`ro). Fix a sequence of positive weights (γτ )τ∈N. A sequence
(u(τ))τ∈N of elements of a normed vector space (F, ‖ · ‖) converges to u ∈ F in the sense of Cesa`ro means
with respect to (γτ )τ if
lim
T→∞
∑
τ∈N:τ≤T γτu
(τ)∑
τ∈N:τ≤T γτ
= u.
We write u(τ)
(γτ )−−−→ u.
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The Stolz-Cesa`ro theorem states that if (u(τ))τ converges to u, then it converges in the sense of Cesa`ro
means with respect to any non-summable sequence (γτ )τ , see for example [16]. The converse is not true in
general. However, if a sequence converges absolutely in the sense of Cesa`ro means, i.e. ‖u(τ)−u‖ (γτ )−−−→ 0, then
a dense subsequence of (u(τ))τ converges to u. To show this, we first show that absolute Cesa`ro convergence
implies statistical convergence, as defined below.
Definition 7 (Statistical convergence). Fix a sequence of positive weights (γτ )τ . A sequence (u
(τ))τ∈N of
elements of a normed vector space (F, ‖ · ‖) converges to u ∈ F statistically with respect to (γτ ) if for all
 > 0, the set of indexes I = {τ ∈ N : ‖u(τ) − u‖ ≥ } has zero density with respect to (γτ ). The density of
a subset of integers I ⊂ N, with respect to the sequence of positive weights (γτ ), is defined to be the limit, if
it exists
lim
T→∞
∑
τ∈I:τ≤T γτ∑
τ∈N:τ≤T γτ
.
Lemma 1. If (u(τ))τ converges to u absolutely in the sense of Cesa`ro means with respect to (γτ ), then it
converges to u statistically with respect to (γτ ).
Proof. Let  > 0. We have for all T ∈ N,
0 ≤
∑
τ∈I : τ≤T γτ ∑
τ∈N : τ≤T γτ
≤
∑
τ∈N:τ≤T γτ‖u(τ) − u‖∑
τ∈N:τ≤T γτ
which converges to 0 since (u(τ))τ converges to u absolutely in the sense of Cesa`ro means. Therefore I has
zero density for all .
We can now show convergence of a dense subsequence.
Proposition 8. If (u(τ))τ∈N converges to u absolutely in the sense of Cesa`ro means with respect to (γτ ),
then there exists a subset of indexes T ⊂ N of density one, such that the subsequence (u(τ))τ∈T converges to
u.
Proof. By Lemma 1, for all  > 0, the set I = {τ ∈ N : ‖u(τ) − u‖ ≥ } has zero density. We will construct
a set I ⊂ N of zero density, such that the subsequence (uτ )τ∈N\I converges. For all k ∈ N∗, let
pk(T ) =
∑
τ∈I 1
k
: τ≤T
γτ
Since pk(T )∑
τ∈N : τ≤T γτ
converges to 0 as T →∞, there exists Tk > 0 such that for all T ≥ Tk, pk(T )∑
τ∈N : τ≤T γτ
≤ 1k .
Without loss of generality, we can assume that (Tk)k∈N∗ is increasing. Now, let
I =
⋃
k∈N∗
(I 1
k
∩ {Tk, . . . , Tk+1 − 1}).
Then we have for all k ∈ N∗, I ∩ {0, . . . , Tk+1 − 1} =
(
∪kj=1I 1j
)
∩ {0, . . . , Tk+1 − 1}. But since I1 ⊂ I 1
2
⊂
· · · ⊂ I 1
k
, we have I ∩ {0, . . . , Tk+1 − 1} ⊂ I 1
k
∩ {0, . . . , Tk+1 − 1}, thus for all T such that Tk ≤ T < Tk+1,
we have ∑
τ∈I : τ≤T γτ∑
τ∈N : τ≤T γτ
≤
∑
τ∈I 1
k
: τ≤T γτ∑
τ∈N : τ≤T γτ
=
pk(T )∑
τ∈N : τ≤T γτ
≤ 1
k
which proves that I has zero density.
Let T = N \ I. We have that T has density one, and it remains to prove that the subsequence (u(τ))τ∈T
converges to u. Since T has density one, it has infinitely many elements, and for all k, there exists Sk ∈ T
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such that Sk ≥ Tk. For all τ ∈ T with τ ≥ Sk, there exists k′ ≥ k such that Tk′ ≤ τ < Tk′+1. Since τ /∈ I
and Tk′ ≤ τ < Tk′+1, we must have τ /∈ I 1
k′
, therefore
‖u(τ) − u‖ < 1
k′
≤ 1
k
.
This proves that (u(τ))τ∈T converges to u.
We now present the main result of this section, which concerns the convergence of the sequence of
population distributions (µ(τ)) to the set N of Nash equilibria. We say that (µ(τ)) converges to N if
d(µ(τ),N )→ 0, where d(µ,N ) = infν∈N ‖µ− ν‖.
Theorem 2. Consider a congestion game with discount factors (γτ )τ satisfying Assumption 2. Assume
that for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, population k has sublinear discounted regret. Then the sequence of distributions
(µ(τ))τ converges to the set of Nash equilibria in the sense of Cesa`ro means with respect to (γτ ). Furthermore,
there exists a dense subsequence (µτ )τ∈T which converges to N .
Proof. First, we observe the following fact:
Lemma 2. A sequence (ν(τ)) in ∆ converges to N only if (V (ν(τ))) converges to VN , the value of V on N .
Indeed, suppose by contradiction that V (ν(τ)) → VN but ν(τ) 6→ N . Then there would exist  > 0 and
a subsequence (ν(τ))τ∈T , T ⊂ N such that d(ν(τ),N ) ≥  for all τ ∈ T . Since ∆ is compact, we can extract
a further subsequence (ν(τ))τ∈T ′ which converges to some ν /∈ N . But by continuity of V , (V (ν(τ)))τ∈T ′
converges to V (ν) > VN , a contradiction.
Consider the potential function V defined in equation (5). By convexity of V and the expression (6) of
its gradient, we have for all τ and for all µ ∈ ∆:
V (µ(τ))− V (µ) ≤
〈
∇V (µ(τ)), µ(τ) − µ
〉
=
K∑
k=1
m(Xk)
〈
`k(µ(τ)), µkp
(τ) − µkp
〉
then taking the time-weighted sum up to iteration T ,
T∑
τ=0
γτ (V (µ
(τ))− V (µ)) ≤
K∑
k=1
m(Xk)
[
T∑
τ=0
γτ
〈
µk
(τ)
, `k(µ(τ))
〉
−
〈
µk,
T∑
τ=0
γτ `
k(µ(τ))
〉]
=
K∑
k=1
m(Xk)
[
Lk
(T ) −
〈
µk,L k
(T )
〉]
≤
K∑
k=1
m(Xk)Rk(T )
where for the last inequality, we use the fact that
〈
µk,L k
(T )
〉
≥ minp∈Pk L kp (T ). In particular, when µ is
a Nash equilibrium, by Theorem 1, V (µ) = minµ∈∆ V (µ) = VN , thus∑T
τ=0 γτ |V (µ(τ))− VN |∑T
τ=0 γτ
≤
K∑
k=1
m(Xk) R
k(T )∑T
τ=0 γτ
Since the population-wide regret Rk
(T )
is assumed to be sublinear for all k, we have |V (µ(τ))− VN | (γτ )−−−→ 0.
By Proposition 8, there exists T ⊂ N of density one, such that (V (µ(τ)))τ∈T converges to VN . And it follows
that (µ(τ))τ∈T converges to N . This proves the second part of the theorem. To prove the first part, we
observe that, by convexity of V ,
VN ≤ V
(∑T
τ=0 γτµ
(τ)∑T
τ=0 γτ
)
≤
∑T
τ=0 γτV (µ
(τ))∑T
τ=0 γτ
= VN +
∑T
τ=0 γτ (V (µ
(τ))− VN )∑T
τ=0 γτ
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and the upper bound converges to VN . Therefore
(∑
τ≤T γτµ
(τ)∑
τ≤T γτ
)
T∈N
converges to N .
To conclude this section, we observe that the Cesa`ro convergence result of Theorem 2 can be generalized
to any game with a convex potential function.
5 Continuous-time dynamics
We now turn to the harder question of convergence of (µ(τ))τ : we seek to derive sufficient conditions under
which the sequence (µ(τ)) converges to N . In this section, we study a continuous-time limit of the update
equation given by the Hedge algorithm. The resulting ODE, known as the replicator equation, will be useful
in proving strong convergence results in the next section.
5.1 The Replicator dynamics
To motivate the study of the replicator dynamics from an online learning point of view, we first derive the
continuous-time replicator dynamics as a limit of the discrete Hedge dynamics, as discussed below. Assume
that in each population Xk, all players start from the same initial distribution pik(0) ∈ ∆Pk , and apply the
Hedge algorithm with learning rates (γτ ). As a result, the sequence of distributions (µ
k(τ)) satisfies the
Hedge update rule (17). Now suppose the existence of an underlying continuous time t ∈ R+, and write µ(t)
the distribution at time t. Suppose that the updates occur at discrete times Tτ , τ ∈ N, such that the time
steps are given by a decreasing, vanishing sequence τ . That is, Tτ+1 − Tτ = τ . Then we have for all k and
all p ∈ Pk, using Landau notation:
µkp(Tτ+1) = µ
k
p
(τ+1)
= µkp
(τ) e−γτ
`kp(µ
(τ))
ρ∑
p′∈Pk µ
k
p′
(τ)
e−γτ
`k
p′ (µ
(τ))
ρ
= µkp
(τ) 1− γτ `
k
p(µ
(τ))
ρ + o(γτ )
1− γτ
∑
p′∈Pk µ
k
p′
(τ) `
k
p′ (µ
(τ))
ρ + o(γτ )
= µkp(Tτ )
[
1 + γτ
¯`k(µ(τ))− `kp(µ(τ))
ρ
]
+ o(γτ )
Thus,
µkp(Tτ+1)− µkp(Tτ )
Tτ+1 − Tτ
τ
γτ
= µkp(Tτ )
¯`k(µ(τ))− `kp(µ(τ))
ρ
+ o(1)
In particular, if we take the discretization time steps τ to be equal to the sequence of learning rate γτ ,
the expression simplifies, and taking the limit as γτ → 0, we obtain the following ODE system:{
µ(0) ∈ ∆˚
∀k, ∀p ∈ Pk, dµ
k
p(t)
dt = µ
k
p(t)
¯`k(µ(t))−`kp(µ(t))
ρ
(20)
where ∆˚ = {µ ∈ ∆: ∀k, ∀p ∈ Pk, µkp > 0} is the relative interior of ∆. Here, we require that the initial
distribution have positive weights on all bundles for the following reason: whenever µkp(0) = 0, any solution
trajectory will have µkp(t) ≡ 0. It is impossible for such trajectories to converge to the set of Nash equilibria
N if the support of equilibria in N contains p. In other words, the replicator dynamics cannot expand the
support of the initial distribution, therefore we require that the initial distribution be supported everywhere.
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Equation (20) defines a vector field F : ∆→ H, where H is the product H = HP1 × · · · × HPK , and
HPk =
v ∈ RPk : ∑
p∈P
vp = 0

is the linear hyperplane parallel to the simplex ∆Pk . Indeed, we have for all µ ∈ ∆ and for all k,∑
p∈Pk
F kp (µ) =
∑
p∈Pk
`kp(µ)µ
k
p − ¯`k(µ)
∑
p∈Pk
µkp = 0.
The following proposition ensures that the solutions remain in the relative interior and are defined on all
times.
Proposition 9. The ODE (20) has a unique solution µ(t) which remains in ∆˚ and is defined on R+.
Proof. First, since the congestion functions cr are assumed to be Lipschitz continuous, so is the vector field
F . We thus have existence and uniqueness of a solution by the Cauchy-Lipschitz theorem.
To show that the solution remains in the relative interior of ∆, we observe that for all k, ddt
∑
p∈Pk µ
k
p(t) =∑
p∈Pk F
k
p (µ(t)) = 0 by the previous observation. Therefore,
∑
p∈Pk µ
k
p(t) is constant and equal to 1. To
show that µkp(t) > 0 for all t in the solution domain, assume by contradiction that there exists t0 > 0 and
p0 ∈ Pk such that µkp0(t0) = 0. Since the solution trajectories are continuous, we can assume, without loss
of generality, that t0 is the infimum of all such times (thus for all t < t0, µp0(t) > 0). Now consider the new
system given by
˙˜µp =
1
ρ
(¯`(µ˜)− `p(µ˜))µ˜p ∀p 6= p0
µ˜p(t0) = µp(t0) ∀p 6= p0
and µ˜p0(t) is identically equal to 0. Any solution of the new system, defined on (t0− δ, t0], is also a solution
of equation (20). Since µ(t0) = µ˜(t0), we have µ ≡ µ˜ by uniqueness of the solution. This leads to a
contradiction since by assumption, for all t < t0, µp(t) > 0 but µ˜p(t) = 0.
This proves that µ remains in ∆˚. Furthermore, since ∆ is compact, we have by Theorem 2.4 in [13] that
the solution is defined on R+ (otherwise it would eventually leave any compact set).
Equation (20) is also studied in Evolutionary Game Theory and is referred to as the replicator dynamics
(see [23] for example). It arises from the following model: for all time t, players of population Xk are matched
in random pairs, and each pair compares their losses. If the two players have strategies p, p′ ∈ Pk, the player
with higher loss imitates the strategy of the other player with probability proportional to the difference in
losses (hence the name replicator), that is, if `kp(µ) > `
k
p′(µ), then the first player switches to bundle p
′ with
probability
`kp(µ)−`kp′ (µ)
ρ . Under this model, we have
dµkp
dt
= µkp
− ∑
p′∈Pk:
`kp(µ)>`
k
p′ (µ)
µkp′
`kp(µ)− `kp′(µ)
ρ
+
∑
p′∈Pk:
`kp(µ)≤`kp′ (µ)
µkp′
`kp′(µ)− `kp(µ)
ρ

= µkp
∑
p′∈Pk
µkp′
`kp′(µ)− `kp(µ)
ρ
= µkp
¯`k(µ)− `kp(µ)
ρ
which results in the same ODE (20).
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5.2 Stationary points of the replicator dynamics
We first give a characterization of stationary points of the replicator dynamics applied to the congestion
game.
Proposition 10. A product distribution µ is a stationary point for the replicator dynamics (20) if and only
if the bundle losses `kp(µ) are equal on the support of µ
k.
This follows immediately from equation (20). We observe in particular that all Nash equilibria are
stationary points, but a stationary point may not be a Nash equilibrium in general: one may have a stationary
point µ such that µkp = 0 but `
k
p(µ) is strictly lower than losses of bundles in the support, which violates the
condition in Definition 1 of a Nash equilibrium.
A stationary point µ with support P ′1 × · · · × P ′K can be viewed as a Nash equilibrium of a modified
congestion game, in which the bundle set of each population Xk is restricted to P ′k. For this reason, stationary
points have been called restricted Nash equilibria by Fischer and Vo¨cking in [10]. We will denote the set of
stationary points by RN , in reference to the aforementioned paper.
Remark 2. By the previous observation, a stationary point with support P ′1 × · · · × P ′K is a minimizer of
the potential function V on the product ∆P
′
1 × · · · ×∆P′K . As the number of support sets is finite, the set of
potential values of stationary points V (RN ) is also finite.
5.3 Convergence of the replicator dynamics
In [10], Fischer and Vo¨cking prove, using a Lyapunov argument, that all solution trajectories of the replicator
system asymptotically approach the set of stationary points RN . Unfortunately, this result only guarantees
convergence to a superset of Nash equilibria. However, this will be useful in the next section, and we present
a proof for completeness.
Proposition 11 (Fischer and Vo¨cling, [10]). Every solution of the system (20) converges to the set of
stationary points RN .
Proof. Consider the potential function V defined by equation (5). The function V is continuously differen-
tiable and its derivative along the vector field of the ODE is given by:
V˙ (µ) = 〈∇V (µ), F (µ)〉
=
K∑
k=1
m(Xk)
∑
p∈Pk
`kp(µ)µ
k
p
 ∑
p′∈Pk
µkp′`
k
p′(µ)− `kp(µ)

=
K∑
k=1
m(Xk)

∑
p∈Pk
µkp`
k
p(µ)
2 − ∑
p∈Pk
µkp`
k
p(µ)
2

By Jensen’s inequality, V˙ (µ) ≤ 0, with equality if and only if µ ∈ RN . Therefore V is defined on the
compact set ∆, and is decreasing along the vector field F . By the LaSalle-Krasovskii invariance principle,
µ(t) approaches the largest invariant set contained in the set where V˙ vanishes, {µ ∈ ∆ : V˙ (µ) = 0} = RN
(for example by Theorem 4.4 in [13]). But since RN itself is an invariant set, µ(t) approaches RN .
5.4 A discrete-time replicator equation: the REP update rule
Inspired by the continuous-time replicator dynamics, we propose a discrete-time multiplicative update rule
by discretizing the ODE (20). The resulting algorithm has many desirable properties such as sublinear
discounted regret and simplicity of implementation. We call it the REP algorithm in reference to the
replicator ODE.
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The vector field F can be written in the following form: for all k, F k(µ) = Gk(µ, `(µ)) where for all p,
Gkp(µ, `) = µ
k
p
〈
µk, `k
〉− `kp
ρ
This motivates the following update rule for a player x ∈ Xk with distribution pi(τ)(x):
pi(τ+1)(x) = pi(τ)(x) + ητG
k(pi(τ)(x), `(µ(τ)))
Definition 8 (Discrete Replicator algorithm). The REP algorithm, applied by player x ∈ Xk, with initial
distribution pi(0) ∈ ∆Pk and learning rates (ητ )τ∈N with ητ ≤ 1, is an online learning algorithm ( Ux (τ))τ∈N
such that the τ -th update function is given by Ux (τ)((`k(µ(t)))t≤τ , pi(τ)) = pi(τ+1), such that
pi(τ+1)p − pi(τ)p = ητpi(τ)p
〈
pi(τ), `k(µ(τ))
〉− `kp(µ(τ))
ρ
(21)
Here,
〈
pi(τ), `k(µ(τ))
〉− `kp(µ(τ)) is the expected instantaneous regret of the player, with respect to bundle
p. Thus the REP update can also be expressed in terms of the previous distribution and the expected
instantaneous regret.
Under the REP update, the sequence of strategy profiles pi(τ) remains in the product of simplexes ∆,
provided ητ ≤ 1 for all τ . Indeed, for all τ ∈ N, we have
∑
p∈Pk
pi(τ+1)p =
∑
p∈Pk
pi(τ)p +
ητ
ρ
¯`k(µ(τ))− ∑
p∈Pk
µ(τ)p `
k
p(µ
(τ))
 = ∑
p∈Pk
pi(τ)p
and
1 + ητ
¯`k(µ(τ))− `kp(µ(τ))
ρ
≥ 1− ητ ≥ 0
if ητ ≤ 1, which guarantees that pi(τ) remains in ∆.
We now show that the REP update rule with learning rates (γτ ) has sublinear discounted regret. First,
we prove the following lemma, for general online learning problems with signed losses.
Lemma 3. Consider a discounted online learning problem, with sequence of discount factors (γτ ), with
γτ ≤ 12 for all τ . Let Pk be the finite decision set, and assume that the losses are signed and bounded,
m
(τ)
p ∈ [−1, 1] for all τ and p ∈ P. Then the multiplicative-weights algorithm defined by the update rule
pi(τ+1) ∝
(
pi(τ)p (1− γτm(τ)p )
)
p∈Pk
(22)
has the following regret bound: for all T and all p ∈ Pk,∑
0≤τ≤T
γτ
〈
m(τ), pi(τ)
〉
≤ − log pi(0)min +
∑
0≤τ≤T
γτm
(τ)
p +
∑
0≤τ≤T
γ2τ |m(τ)p |
where pi
(0)
min = minp∈Pk pi
(0)
p .
Proof. We extend the proof of Theorem 2.1 in [1] to the discounted case. By a simple induction, we have
for all T , pi(T ) is proportional to the vector w(T ), defined as follows
w(T )p = pi
(0)
p
∏
0≤τ<T
(1− γτm(τ)p ).
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Define the function ξ(T ) =
∑
p w
(T )
p . Then pi
(T )
p =
w(T )p
ξ(T )
, and we have for all T :
ξ(T+1) =
∑
p
w(T+1)p =
∑
p
w(T )p (1− γTm(T )p )
= ξ(T ) − γT
∑
p
m(T )p pi
(T )
p ξ
(T )
= ξ(T )
(
1− γT
〈
m(T ), pi(T )
〉)
≤ ξ(T )e−γT 〈m(T ),pi(T )〉
Thus, by induction on T ,
ξ(T+1) ≤ exp
− ∑
0≤τ≤T
γτ
〈
m(τ), pi(τ)
〉
We also have for all p,
ξ(T+1) ≥ w(T+1)p ≥ pi(0)min
∏
0≤τ≤T
(1− γtm(τ)p )
Combining the bounds on ξ(τ) and taking logarithms, we have∑
0≤τ≤T
γτ
〈
m(τ), pi(τ)
〉
≤ − log pi(0)min −
∑
0≤τ≤T
log(1− γτm(τ)p )
To obtain the desired bound, it suffices to show that for all m ∈ [−1, 1] and γ ∈ [0, 12 ],
− log(1− γm) ≤ γm+ γ2|m|
Define hm(γ) = − log(1 − γm) − γm − γ2|m|. We have hm(0) = 0, and h′m(γ) = m1−γm − m − 2γ|m| =
γ|m|(|m|+2γm−2)
1−γm . Observing that |m| + 2γm − 2 ≤ 0 for all m ∈ [−1, 1] and γ ∈ [0, 12 ], we have that
h′m(γ) ≤ 0 on [0, 12 ], and it follows that hm(γ) ≤ hm(0) = 0.
Proposition 12. If the sequence of discounts (γτ ) is bounded by
1
2 and is such that
∑
τ≤T γ
2
τ/
∑
τ≤T γτ
converges to 0, then the REP algorithm with learning rates γτ has sublinear discounted regret.
Proof. Let
r(τ)p =
〈
pi(τ), `k(µ(τ))
〉
− `kp(µ(τ)) ∈ [−ρ, ρ]
be the instantaneous regret of the player. Then the REP update can be viewed as a multiplicative-weights
algorithm with update rule (22), in which the vector of signed losses is given by m
(τ)
p = − rp
(τ)
ρ ∈ [−1, 1],
and discount factors (γτ ). Observing that
〈
r(τ), pi(τ)
〉
= 0, we have by Lemma 3, for all p ∈ Pk:
1
ρ
∑
0≤τ≤T
γτr
(τ)
p ≤ − log pi(0)min +
∑
0≤τ≤T
γ2τ
Rearranging and taking the maximum over p ∈ Pk, we obtain the following bound on the discounted regret
R(T )(x) ≤ −ρ log pi(0)min + ρ
∑
0≤τ≤T
γ2τ
which shows lim supT→∞
1∑
τ≤T γτ
R(T )(x) ≤ 0.
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Interestingly, the REP update can also be obtained as the solution to a regularized version of the greedy
update minpi∈∆Pk
〈
pi, `
k(µ(τ))
ρ
〉
, similarly to the Hedge update (see Proposition 6), with a different regular-
ization function.
Proposition 13. The REP update rule is solution to the following regularized problem:
{pi(τ+1)} = arg min
pi∈∆
〈
pi,
`k(µ(τ))
ρ
〉
+
1
ητ
R(pi‖pi(τ))
where R(pi‖ν) = 12
∑
p∈Pk pip
(
pip
νp
− 1
)2
is a divergence measure of pi from ν.
Proof. The proof is similar to Proposition 6. We define the Lagrangian:
L(pi;λ) =
∑
p∈P
pip
`k(µ(τ))
ρ
+
1
2γτ
∑
p∈Pk
pi(τ)p
(
pip
pi
(τ)
p
− 1
)2
− λ
∑
p∈Pk
pip − 1

where λ ∈ R is the dual variable for the constraint ∑p∈Pk pip = 1. Its gradient is:
∂
∂pip
L(pi;λ) = `
k
p(µ
(τ))
ρ
+
1
γτ
(
pip
pi
(τ)
p
− 1
)
− λ forall p ∈ Pk
∂
∂λ
L(pi;λ) = −
∑
p∈Pk
pip + 1
and (pi?, λ?) are primal-dual optimal if and only if
pi?p
pi
(τ)
p
= 1 + γτ
(
λ− `
k
p(µ
(τ))
ρ
)
and
∑
p∈Pk
pi?p = 1
Multiplying by pi
(τ)
p and taking the sum over p ∈ Pk, we have 1 = 1 + γτλ? − γτ
〈
pi(τ), `
k(µ(τ))
ρ
〉
, i.e.
λ? =
〈
pi(τ), `
k(µ(τ))
ρ
〉
, thus the solution pi? satisfies the REP update rule (21).
6 Strong convergence of discounted no-regret learning
In this section, we give sufficient conditions which guarantee convergence of the sequence of population
strategies. The idea is to show that, under these conditions, the discrete process (µ(τ))τ∈N, approaches, in
a certain sense, the trajectories of the continuous-time replicator dynamics. Then one can show, using a
Lyapunov function, that any limit point of the discrete process must lie in the set of stationary points RN .
With an additional argument, we show that, in fact, limit points lie in the set N of Nash equilibria.
We start by reviewing results from the theory of stochastic approximation, which we use in the proof of
Theorem 4.
6.1 Results from the theory of stochastic approximation
We summarize results from Bena¨ım [3]. Let D ⊂ Rn, and consider a dynamical system given by the ODE
µ˙ = F (µ) (23)
where F : D → Rn is a continuous globally integrable vector field, with unique integral curves which remain
in D. Let Φ be the associated flow function
Φ: R+ ×D → D
(t, µ) 7→ Φt(µ)
such that t 7→ Φt(µ(0)) is the solution trajectory of (23) with initial condition µ(0) = µ(0).
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6.1.1 Discrete-time approximation
We now define what it means for a discrete process to approach the trajectories of the system (23).
Let (µ(τ))τ be a discrete-time process with values in D. (µ(τ))τ is said to be a discrete-time approximation
of the dynamical system (23) if there exists a sequence (γτ )τ∈N of nonnegative real numbers such that∑
τ∈N γτ =∞ and limτ→∞ γτ = 0, and a sequence of deterministic or random perturbations U (τ) ∈ Rn such
that for all τ ,
µ(τ+1) − µ(τ) = γτ
(
F (µ(τ)) + U (τ+1)
)
. (24)
Given such a discrete-time approximation, we can define the affine interpolated process of (µ(τ)): let
Tτ =
∑τ
t=0 γt as in Section 5.1.
Definition 9 (Affine interpolated process). The continuous time affine interpolated process of the discrete
process (µ(τ))τ∈N is the function M : R+ → Rn defined by
M(Tτ + s) = µ
(τ) + s
µ(τ+1) − µ(τ)
γτ
, ∀τ ∈ N and ∀s ∈ [0, γτ )
The next proposition gives sufficient conditions for an affine interpolated process to be an APT.
Proposition 14 (Proposition 4.1 in [3]). Let M be the affine interpolated process of the discrete-time
approximation (µ(τ)), and assume that:
1. For all T > 0,
lim
τ1→∞
max
τ2:
τ2∑
τ=τ1
γτ<T
∥∥∥∥∥
τ2∑
τ=τ1
γτU
(τ+1)
∥∥∥∥∥ = 0 (25)
2. supτ∈N ‖µ(τ)‖ <∞
Then M is an APT of the flow Φ induced by the vector field F .
Furthermore, we have the following sufficient condition for property (25) to hold:
Proposition 15. Let (µ(τ))τ∈N be a discrete time approximation of the system (23). Let (Ω,F ,P) be a
probability space and (Fτ )τ∈N a filtration of F . Suppose that the perturbations satisfy the Robbins-Monroe
conditions: for all τ ∈ N,
i) U (τ) is measurable with respect to Fτ
ii) E[U (τ+1)|Fτ ] = 0
Furthermore, suppose that there exists q ≥ 2 such that
sup
τ∈N
E[‖U (τ)‖q] <∞ and
∑
τ∈N
γ1+q/2τ <∞
Then, condition (1) of Proposition 14 holds with probability one.
6.1.2 Chain transitivity
We next give an important property of limit points of bounded asymptotic pseudo-trajectories, given in
Theorem 3.
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Definition 10 (Pseudo-orbit and chain transitivity). A (δ, T )-pesudo-orbit from a ∈ D to b ∈ D is a
finite sequence of partial trajectories. It is given by a sequence of points (ti, yi), i ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}, and the
corresponding sequence of partial trajectories
{Φt(yi) : 0 ≤ t ≤ ti}; i = 0, . . . , k − 1
such that ti ≥ T for all i, and
d(y0, a) < δ
d(Φti(yi), yi+1) < δ, i = 0, . . . , k − 1
yk = b
The conditions are illustrated in Figure 2. We write Φ: a ↪→δ,T b if there exists a (δ, T )-pesudo-orbit from a
to b. We write a ↪→ b if a ↪→δ,T b for all δ, T > 0. The flow Φ is said to be chain transitive if a ↪→ b for all
a, b ∈ D.
a
δ
y0
Φt0(y0)
y1 Φtk−1(yk−1)
yk = b
Figure 2: A (δ, T )-pesudo-orbit from a to b.
In the remainder of this section, let Γ ⊂ D be a compact invariant set for Φ, that is, Φt(Γ) ⊆ Γ for all
t ∈ R+.
Definition 11 (Internally chain transitive set). The compact invariant set Γ is internally chain transitive
if the restriction of Φ to Γ is chain transitive.
Theorem 3 (Theorem 5.7 in [3]). Let X be a bounded APT of (23). Then the limit set
L(X) =
⋂
t≥0
{X(s) : s ≥ t}
is internally chain transitive.
Finally, we give the following property of internally chain transitive sets:
Proposition 16 (Proposition 6.4 in [3]). Let Γ ⊂ D be a compact invariant set and suppose that there exists
a Lyapunov function V : D → R for Γ (that is, V is continuous and ddtV (x(t)) = 〈∇V (x(t)), F (x(t))〉 < 0
for all x /∈ Γ) such that V (Γ) has empty interior. Then every internally chain transitive set L is contained
in Γ and V is constant on L.
6.2 The AREP class
Now, we are ready to define a class of online learning algorithms which we call AREP for Approximate
REPlicator. An AREP online algorithm can be viewed as a perturbed version of the replicator algorithm.
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Definition 12 (AREP algorithm). An online learning algorithm, applied by player x ∈ Xk, with output
sequence (pi(τ))τ∈N, is said to be an approximate replicator (AREP) algorithm if its update equation can be
written as
pi(τ+1)p − pi(τ)p = γτ
(
pi(τ)p
〈
pi(τ), `k(µ(τ))
〉− `kp(µ(τ))
ρ
+ U (τ)p
)
(26)
where (U (τ))τ∈N is a bounded sequence of stochastic perturbations with values in RPk , and which satisfies
condition (25).
In particular, the REP algorithm given in Definition 8 is an AREP algorithm with zero perturbations.
It turns out that the Hedge algorithm also belongs to the AREP class.
Proposition 17. The Hedge algorithm with learning rates (γτ )τ satisfying Assumption 2 is an AREP
algorithm.
Proof. Let (pi(τ))τ∈N be the sequence of strategies, and let (µ(τ))τ be any sequence of population distributions.
By definition of the Hedge algorithm, we have
pi(τ+1)p = pi
(τ)
p exp
(
−γτ
`kp(µ
(τ))
ρ
)
/
∑
p′∈Pk
pi
(τ)
p′ exp
(
−γτ
`kp′(µ
(τ))
ρ
)
which we can write in the form of equation (26), with perturbation terms
U (τ+1)p =
pi
(τ)
p
γτ
[
exp
(
−γτ `
k
p(µ
(τ))− ˜`k(τ)
ρ
)
+ γτ
`kp(µ
(τ))− ˜`k(τ)
ρ
− 1
]
+ pi(τ)p
˜`k(τ) − ¯`k(τ)
ρ
where
˜`k(τ) = − ρ
γτ
log
∑
p′∈Pk
pi
(τ)
p′ exp
(
−γτ
`kp′(µ
(τ))
ρ
)
¯`k(τ) =
〈
pi(τ), `k(µ(τ))
〉
Letting θ(x) = ex − x− 1, we have for all p ∈ Pk:
U (τ+1)p =
pi
(τ)
p
γτ
θ
(
−γτ
`kp(µ
(τ))− ˜`k(τ)
ρ
)
+
pi
(τ)
p
ρ
(˜`k(τ) − ¯`k(τ))
The first term is a O(γτ ) as θ(x) ∼0 x2/2. To bound the second term, we have by concavity of the logarithm
˜`k(τ) = − ρ
γτ
log
∑
p′∈Pk
pi
(τ)
p′ exp
(
−γτ `p
′(µ(τ))
ρ
)
≤
∑
p′∈Pk
pi
(τ)
p′ `
k
p′(µ
(τ)) = ¯`k(τ)
And by Hoeffding’s lemma,
log
∑
p′∈Pk
pip′ exp
(
−γτ `p
′(µ(τ))
ρ
)
≤ −γτ
∑
p′∈Pk
pi
(τ)
p′
`p′(µ
(τ))
ρ
+
γ2τ
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Rearranging, we have 0 ≤ ¯`k(τ)− ˜`k(τ) ≤ ργτ8 , therefore Up(τ + 1) = O(γτ ), and∥∥∥∥∥
τ2∑
τ=τ1
γτU(τ + 1)
∥∥∥∥∥ = O
(
τ2∑
τ=τ1
γ2t
)
.
Finally, since γτ ↓ 0, maxτ2:∑τ2τ=τ1
∑τ2
τ1
γ2τ converges to 0 as τ1 →∞, therefore condition (25) is verified.
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6.3 Convergence of AREP algorithms with sublinear discounted regret
We now give the main convergence result.
Theorem 4. Suppose that the population strategies (µ(τ))τ obey an AREP update rule with sublinear dis-
counted regret. Then (µ(τ)) converges to the set of Nash equilibria N .
Proof. By assumption, we have
µ(τ+1)p − µ(τ)p = γτ
(
Gkp
(
µ(τ), `(µ(τ))
)
+ U (τ+1)p
)
= γτ
(
F kp (µ
(τ)) + U (τ+1)p
)
where, by definition of the AREP class, the perturbations U (τ) satisfy condition 1 of Proposition 14. Con-
dition 2 is also satisfied since the sequence (µ(τ))τ lies in the compact set ∆. Thus by Proposition 14, the
affine interpolated process M of (µ(τ))τ is an APT of the continuous-time replicator system µ˙ = F (µ). Thus
by Theorem 3, the limit set L(M) is internally chain transitive.
Consider the set of restricted Nash equilibria RN . This set is invariant (RN is the set of stationary
points of the vector field) and compact (RN is the finite union of compact sets by Remark 2). The Rosenthal
potential function V is a Lyapunov function forRN (see proof of Theorem 2), and V (RN ) has empty interior
since it is a finite set by Remark 2. Therefore we can apply Proposition 16 to conclude that the set of limit
points L(M) is contained in RN and V is constant over L(M). Let v be this constant value.
Next, we show that the sequence of potentials V (µ(τ)) converges. Let vˆ be a limit point of V (µ(τ)). Then
by Lemma 2, vˆ = V (µˆ) where µˆ is a limit point of (µ(τ)). In particular, µˆ ∈ L(M), thus vˆ = V (µˆ) = v. This
shows that the bounded sequence (V (µ(τ))) has a unique limit point v, therefore it converges to v, and it
remains to show that v = VN to conclude (by Lemma 2).
To show that v = VN , we first observe that since V (µ(τ)) → v, we also have V (µ(τ)) (γτ )−−−→ v. But the
population dynamics is also assumed to have sublinear discounted regret, thus by Theorem 2, V (µ(τ))
(γτ )−−−→
VN . By uniqueness of the limit, we must have v = VN .
Note that Theorem 4 assumes that the AREP update rule is applied to the population dynamics (µ(τ)),
not to individual strategies pi(τ)(x). One sufficient condition for µ(τ) to satisfy an AREP update is that for
each k, all players in Xk start from a common initial distribution pik(0) = µk(0), and apply the same update
rule. This guarantees that for all τ and for all x, µ(τ) = pi(τ)(x).
6.4 Convergence of the REP and Hedge algorithms
We apply Theorem 4 to show convergence of the REP and Hedge algorithms.
Corollary 1. If (µ(τ)) obeys the REP update rule with learning rates γτ satisfying Assumption 2 and such
that γτ ≤ 12 , then µ(τ) → N .
Proof. The REP update rule is a discounted no-regret algorithm by Proposition 12, and it is an AREP
algorithm with zero perturbations, so we can apply Theorem 4.
Corollary 2. If (µ(τ)) obeys the discounted Hedge update rule with learning rates γτ satisfying Assumption 2
and such that
∑
τ γ
2
τ <∞, then µ(τ) → N .
Proof. By Proposition 7 and Proposition 17, the discounted Hedge algorithm with rates γτ is an AREP
algorithm with sublinear discounted regret, and we can apply Theorem 4.
We illustrate these corollaries with a routing game on the example network introduced in Section 2.5. We
simulate the population dynamics under the discounted Hedge algorithm (Figure 3) and the REP algorithm
(Figure 4). In both cases, we use a harmonic sequence of learning rates, γτ =
20
10+τ . The figures show a
typical behavior of the population dynamics: if the starting learning rates are large, the trajectories can first
oscillate, but as the learning rates decrease, the trajectories converge to the Nash equilibrium.
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Figure 3: Simulation of the population dynamics under the discounted Hedge algorithm, initialized at the
uniform distribution. The trajectories of the population strategies µk
(τ)
are given in the 2-simplex for each
population (bottom). The path losses `kp(µ
(τ)) for both populations (top) converge to a common value on the
support on the Nash equilibrium. The sequences of discounted regrets (middle) confirm that the population
regret is sub-linear, i.e. lim supt→∞
Rk
(t)∑
τ≤t γτ
≤ 0.
7 Conclusion
We studied the convergence of online learning dynamics in the non-atomic congestion game. We showed that
dynamics with sub-linear discounted population regret guarantee the convergence of (µ¯(τ)), the sequence of
Cesa`ro means of population strategies. To obtain convergence of the actual sequence of strategies (µ(τ)), we
introduced the AREP class of approximate replicator dynamics, inspired by the replicator ODE. We showed
that whenever the population strategies obey an AREP dynamics and have sub-linear discounted regret,
the sequence converges. These results assume that the sequence of discount factors (γτ ) is identical for all
players. One question is whether this assumption can be relaxed, so that different players can use different
learning rates.
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Figure 4: Simulation of the population dynamics under the REP algorithm.
References
[1] S. Arora, E. Hazan, and S. Kale, The multiplicative weights update method: a meta-algorithm and
applications., Theory of Computing, 8 (2012), pp. 121–164.
[2] J.-Y. Audibert and S. Bubeck, Minimax policies for adversarial and stochastic bandits, in COLT,
2009.
[3] M. Bena¨ım, Dynamics of stochastic approximation algorithms, in Se´minaire de probabilite´s XXXIII,
Springer, 1999, pp. 1–68.
[4] A. Blum, E. Even-Dar, and K. Ligett, Routing without regret: on convergence to nash equilibria of
regret-minimizing algorithms in routing games, in Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM sympo-
sium on Principles of distributed computing, PODC ’06, New York, NY, USA, 2006, ACM, pp. 45–52.
[5] S. Boyd and L. Vandenberghe, Convex Optimization, vol. 25, Cambridge University Press, 2010.
[6] S. Bubeck, Introduction to online optimization, Lecture Notes, (2011).
28
[7] S. Bubeck and N. Cesa-Bianchi, Regret analysis of stochastic and nonstochastic multi-armed bandit
problems, Foundations and Trends in Machine Learning, 5 (2012), pp. 1–122.
[8] S. Bubeck, V. Perchet, and P. Rigollet, Bounded regret in stochastic multi-armed bandits, CoRR,
abs/1302.1611 (2013).
[9] N. Cesa-Bianchi and G. Lugosi, Prediction, learning, and games, Cambridge University Press, 2006.
[10] S. Fischer and B. Vo¨cking, On the evolution of selfish routing, in Algorithms–ESA 2004, Springer,
2004, pp. 323–334.
[11] D. H. Fremlin, Measure theory, vol. 4, Torres Fremlin, 2000.
[12] Y. Freund and R. E. Schapire, Adaptive game playing using multiplicative weights, Games and
Economic Behavior, 29 (1999), pp. 79–103.
[13] H. Khalil, Nonlinear systems, Macmillan Pub. Co., 1992.
[14] E. Koutsoupias and C. Papadimitriou, Worst-case equilibria, in In proceedings of the 16th annual
symposium on theoretical aspects of computer science, 1999, pp. 404–413.
[15] N. Littlestone and M. K. Warmuth, The weighted majority algorithm, in Foundations of Computer
Science, 1989., 30th Annual Symposium on, IEEE, 1989, pp. 256–261.
[16] M. Muresan, A concrete approach to classical analysis, Springer, 2009.
[17] J. Nash, Non-cooperative games, The Annals of Mathematics, 54 (1951), pp. 286–295.
[18] R. W. Rosenthal, A class of games possessing pure-strategy nash equilibria, International Journal of
Game Theory, 2 (1973), pp. 65–67.
[19] T. Roughgarden, Routing games, in Algorithmic game theory, Cambridge University Press, 2007,
ch. 18, pp. 461–486.
[20] T. Roughgarden and E´. Tardos, How bad is selfish routing?, Journal of the ACM (JACM), 49
(2002), pp. 236–259.
[21] W. H. Sandholm, Potential games with continuous player sets, Journal of Economic Theory, 97 (2001),
pp. 81–108.
[22] J. G. Wardrop, Some theoretical aspects of road traffic research., in ICE Proceedings: Engineering
Divisions, vol. 1, Thomas Telford, 1952, pp. 325–362.
[23] J. W. Weibull, Evolutionary game theory, MIT press, 1997.
29
A Proof of Hoeffding’s Lemma
Lemma 4 (Hoeffding’s lemma). Let X be any real-valued random variable such that X ∈ [a, b] almost surely.
Then, for all s ∈ R:
logE[esX ] ≤ sE[X] + s
2(b− a)2
8
Proof. Fix s ∈ R. We first consider the case when X is centered, i.e. E[X] = 0. Since x 7→ esx is a convex
function, we have for all x ∈ [a, b],
esx ≤ b− x
b− ae
sa +
x− a
b− a e
sb
Thus,
E[esX ] ≤ b
b− ae
sa − a
b− ae
sb = esa(1− p+ pes(b−a))
where p = − ab−a . Taking the logarithm, we have:
log(esa(1− p+ pes(b−a))) = −qp+ log(1− p+ peq) = g(q)
with q = s(b− a). We have
g′(q) = −p+ pe
q
1− p+ peq
g′′(q) =
(1− p)peq
(1− p+ peq)2
thus g′(0) = g(0) = 0, and for all q, g′′(q) ≤ 14 . Therefore, by Taylor’s expansion, we have g(q) ≤ q
2
8 , and it
follows that logE[esX ] ≤ s2(b−a)28 .
Now consider the general (non-centered) case. We have
logE[esX ] = log
(
esE[X] E[es(X−E[X]]
)
= sE[X] + logE[es(X−E[X])]
and the result follows by applying the centered case to the variable X − E[X].
B Proof of Rosenthal’s Theorem
Proof. First, write the convex optimization problem as
minimizeµkp≥0,φr
∑
r∈R
∫ φr
0
cr(u)du
subject to φ = M¯µ
∀k,
∑
p∈Pk
µkp = 1
Writing the Lagrangian, we have:
L(µ,φ;λ, v, w)
=
∑
r∈R
∫ φr
0
cr(u)du−
K∑
k=1
∑
p∈Pk
λkpµ
k
p +
∑
r∈R
vr((Mµ)r − φr)−
K∑
k=1
wk
∑
p∈Pk
µkp − 1

where λk ∈ RPk+ , v ∈ RR and w ∈ RK . Then by strong duality (Slater’s condition holds), (µ, φ;λ, v, w) are
primal-dual optimal variables if and only if the following optimality conditions hold (se for example [5]):
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• Stationarity: for all r, ∂L∂φr (µ, φ;λ, v, w) = 0, and ∀k, ∀p ∈ Pk, ∂L∂µkp (µ, φ;λ, v, w) = 0, i.e.
∀r ∈ R, cr(φr)− vr = 0
∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, ∀p ∈ Pk, m(Xk)
∑
r∈p
vr − λkp − wk = 0
• Complementary slackness:
∀k, ∀p ∈ Pk, λkpµkp = 0
Therefore we have for all k, for all bundles p ∈ Pk, the bundle loss is
`kp(µ) =
∑
r∈p
cr(φr) =
∑
r∈p
vr =
wk + λ
k
p
m(Xk)
by the stationarity conditions. Additionally, if bundle p has positive mass µkp, by complementary slackness,
the corresponding dual variable λkp is zero, thus
µkp > 0⇒ `kp(µ) =
wk
m(Xk)
therefore all bundles p ∈ Pk with positive mass have a common latency wkm(Xk) , and bundles with zero mass
have latency greater than or equal to wkm(Xk) (since λ
k
p ≥ 0). This is equivalent to Definition 1 of a Nash
equilibrium of the congestion game.
Nash equilibria are also said to be essentially unique, in the sense of the following proposition.
Proposition 18. The bundle losses `kp are constant on N .
Proof. Let µ1, µ2 ∈ N , and λ ∈ [0, 1]. We have for all r ∈ R, µ 7→
∫ (Mµ)r
0
cr(u)du is convex. We have
VN = λV (µ1) + (1− λ)V (µ2)
=
∑
r∈R
(
λ
∫ (Mµ1)r
0
cr(φ)dφ+ (1− λ)
∫ (Mµ2)r
0
cr(φ)dφ
)
≥
∑
r∈R
∫ (M(λµ1+(1−λ)µ2))r
0
cr(u)du by convexity
= V (λµ1 + (1− λ)µ2)
= VN
where the last equality follows from the fact that λµ1 + (1 − λ)µ2 ∈ N since N is convex. Therefore the
convexity inequalities must hold with equality and µ 7→ ∫ (Mµ)r
0
cr(u)du is linear on [µ1, µ2]. Therefore
φ 7→ cr(φ) is constant on [(Mµ1)r, (Mµ2)r], and it follows that `kp is constant on [µ1, µ2], since `kp(µ) =∑
r∈p cr((Mµ)r)
C Additional proofs
Fact 1. Let (γτ )τ be a positive real sequence satisfying Assumption 2, that is, γτ is decreasing and
∑
γτ =∞.
Then
lim
T→∞
∑
τ≤T γ
2
τ∑
τ≤T γτ
= 0
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Proof. Fix  > 0. Since γτ decreases to 0, there exists τ1 such that for all τ > τ1, γτ < , thus for all T > τ1∑T
τ=1 γ
2
τ∑T
τ=1 γτ
≤
∑
τ≤τ1 γ
2
τ∑T
τ=1 γτ
+ 
and the first term converges to 0, which proves the claim.
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